We investigate the incentive effects of insurance experience rating on road safety by evaluating the claim frequency following a regulatory reform introduced in a pilot city in China. Our contribution to the growing literature on moral hazard is to offer a neat identification of a causal effect of experience rating on road safety by employing the framework of a natural experiment. We find that basing insurance pricing on traffic violations reduces claim frequency significantly. These results are robust to the inclusion of vehicle controls, alternative definitions of claim frequency, and several robustness checks. The effects of improving insurance pricing on past claims are not significant.
Introduction
Traffic accidents cause serious injuries, disabilities and fatalities all over the world. It is therefore worthwhile to study what policy interventions can improve road safety, and how effective these policies are. Improvements in automobile safety equipment and highway design, strict enforcement of traffic laws and attempts to stimulate safe driving behavior via monetary or non-monetary incentives are regarded as three important channels to enhance road safety (Vukina and Nestić, 2015) . Concerning incentives, monetary mechanisms such as fines and non-monetary mechanisms such as point-record drivers' licenses have proven to be effective 1 .
An experienced-rated premium based on past claims and traffic violations in multi-period insurance contracts is another form of monetary incentive, which can be justified by the potential presence of asymmetric information between insured and insurer regarding individual risks (Dionne et al., 2013b) . However, the causal effect of asymmetric information on automobile accidents is far from confirmed, because appropriate data isolating the causality of the incentive effects are rare.
The main goal of this study is to fill this gap in the literature by reporting the results of a natural experiment on insurance incentives for road safety. The introduction of experience rating in a pilot city in China has the features of a natural experiment, which allows us to examine drivers' reactions to the introduction of exogenous incentives for safe driving. We contribute to this expanding literature by investigating the impact of insurance incentives on road safety with a different methodology. We also provide evidence of the presence of moral hazard in the vehicle insurance market studied.
Asymmetric information goes in two directions in insurance contracting: adverse selection and moral hazard, both of which indicate a positive correlation between accident probability and the generosity of the coverage chosen by the insured. Adverse selection means that high-risk insured choose more coverage than do low-risk insured, whereas moral hazard means that more coverage reduces the incentives for safe driving and therefore causes more accidents. The literature that tries to disentangle these two information problems dates back to Arrow (1963) .
In the presence of moral hazard, past claim or traffic violation pricing may help reduce future accidents (Abbring et al., 2003; Bourgeon and Picard, 2007) . For adverse selection, risk classification seems more efficient Snow, 1985, 1986; Hoy, 1982) . It is then important to empirically distinguish moral hazard from adverse selection because it can give insight into the optimal policy scheme that can reduce inefficiencies associated with asymmetric information (Weisburd, 2015) .
The evidence of moral hazard in the automobile insurance market is mixed. Using crosssectional data, Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001) find no evidence of asymmetric information. Chiappori and Salanié (2000; 2013) suggest that either dynamic panel data or a natural experiment 2 should be exploited to disentangle adverse selection and moral hazard. Although panel data were employed, some studies (Abbring et al., 2003; 2 Natural experiments where the population is randomly split into groups are valuable but scarce. If identical populations face different incentives schemes for exogenous reasons, this can be regarded as a quasi-natural experiment to test for moral hazard. In this paper, the experiment is mainly a quasi-natural experiment; the resulting change in driving behavior can be attributed to moral hazard when the population remains unchanged in each group (Chiappori, 2000) . Ghali, 2005; Rowel et al., forthcoming; Zavadil, 2015) did not find any evidence of moral hazard while other scholars did (Dionne et al., 2011; Dionne et al., 2013a; Israel, 2007; Wang et al., 2008; Weisburd, 2015) . To our knowledge, few studies utilize natural experiments related to an exogenous regulatory change because appropriate data available before and after natural experiments are scarce. There are a few exceptions, namely the studies by Dionne and Ghali (2005) , Dionne et al. (2011) , Lee (2013) , and Li et al. (2007) . Nonetheless, these studies do not meet all the criteria for strong conclusions regarding causal effects. The major problem is that these studies do not have access to a satisfactory control group, which is necessary to identify other changes that may have affected insurance incentives for road safety during the experiment.
Overcoming these limitations, we consider the introduction of an experience rating mechanism in a pilot city in China as a natural experiment, which gives us an opportunity to use the methodology of difference-in-differences (henceforth, DID). The experiment compares the effect of the reform in the pilot city with the experience of another city unaffected by the reform to investigate the effect of insurance incentives on road safety. The paper most closely related to our contribution is that of Abay (forthcoming) , which examines the introduction of a demerit-point scheme in Denmark as a natural experiment to investigate the differential behavioral responses of the drivers in the treatment and control groups using DID. Yet because of data limitations, the research design of this study endogenously separates drivers into treatment and control groups based on their driving behavior after a common reform for the two groups, which is not the best practice for conducting a DID study. Ashenfelter (1978) imported the DID methodology from the natural sciences to economic research. Since then, this methodology has been utilized extensively to evaluate the effectiveness of policy interventions in the economic literature. Compared with the wide applications of DID in education and health economics, public economics and other fields of economics (Bauernschuster and Schlotterm, 2015; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ), our study is the first to analyze the impact of insurance experience rating on safe driving using an appropriate DID design. We find that the incentive effects of the enforcement of an experience rating scheme based on traffic violations in repeated insurance contracts have a strongly significant impact on accident frequency. We conducted a series of robustness checks to confirm the validity of our empirical findings. Our results are robust to the inclusion of various available controls, alternative definitions of accident frequency, and several robustness checks.
We also find that the effects of improving the experienced-rated pricing based on past claims are not significant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background of the research setting and introduces the regulatory reform in vehicle insurance pricing. Section 3 presents the data, summary statistics, and methodology. Section 4 reviews the main estimation reform effects on road safety and the robustness analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Institutional background and regulatory reform

Institutional background
All vehicle insurers in China offer almost the same contract options to the market under strictly regulated pricing rules. The vehicle insurance market consists of two parts: 1) compulsory third-party liability insurance and 2) commercial insurance. This article investigates the commercial insurance part. The four main lines of commercial insurance are vehicle damage and loss insurance, third-party liability insurance, theft insurance, and driver and passenger liability insurance. As in many other countries, insurers in China use both a priori pricing and a posteriori pricing. A priori pricing is based on observable variables, whereas a posteriori pricing is based on a bonus-malus coefficient (henceforth BMC). In a priori pricing insurers compute the base premium at the start of the contract given observables such as the age and value of the vehicle. The base premium should be identical across insured with the same characteristics. When contracts are renewed, premiums are revised using the BMC adjusted on past claims, which is supposed to work as an incentive scheme for safe driving.
Although the experience-rated premium has existed in the Chinese vehicle insurance market for a long time, its efficiency is questionable. Given the fierce competition among vehicle insurers and the lack of an obligation to share claims information in a common platform, insurers are not committed to enforcing the BMC because insured can easily escape the cost of their bad record by switching to another insurer without any punishment. Dionne and Ghali (2005) assessed the impact of introducing experience rating on road safety in Tunisia, and found that the effect was not statistically significant. One possible explanation for this was that the new experience rating scheme was not put into best practice because there was no sharing of information on past experience of insured between insurers, and therefore no commitment to use the potentially public information. Another explanation is that the pricing was based on reported past claims and not on total past accidents.
Regulatory reform
To enhance incentives and fairness in vehicle insurance, a pricing reform was implemented in the vehicle insurance market of Shenzhen, a city in the province of Guangdong, China. This regulatory reform established a new vehicle insurance pricing mechanism based on past claims and traffic violations of the insured. The pricing mechanism in other markets in Guangdong remained unchanged. We consider the reform city as the treatment group. The city of Foshan, also located in Guangdong, near the pilot city, acts as the control group 3 . Figure 1 illustrates the two-stage reform introduced in the treatment city. Stage 1 started on March 1, 2011 and premiums continued to be revised according to past claims. However, the BMC was steeper in the treatment city than in the control city, where the BMC was not affected. 3 The growth rates for the total population, the ratio of males in the total population, and the number of civil vehicles during our study period (from 2009 to 2012) Figure 1 -Two-stage reform in the treatment city This figure depicts the two-stage reform introduced in the treatment city. The two vertical lines indicate the start of the two reforms respectively. In the three boxes, yes or no at 1 indicates whether the bonus malus factor has switched to a bigger range; at 2, whether there is enforcement of insurers' application of the new bonus malus factor using public information on past claims; and at 3 whether the premium is also based on traffic violations with the same enforcement of insurers' use of information on violations.
This first-stage reform was introduced to improve the effectiveness of the BMC. Previously, the multiplicative coefficient of the base premium ranged from 0.7 to 1.3 (Panel 1b). After this first-stage reform it changed to between 0.5 and 2.0 for the treatment city (Panel 1a).In both cities, each new insured starts at a BMC equal to one. In the treatment city, insured who filed more than three claims during the last year get higher BMCs than in the control city, but the difference is not very important although it is even more penalizing than in the control city.
The higher penalizing structure is more for bad drivers who accumulate more than four claims during a given year. An insured has to cumulate more than ten accidents in the previous year to get the maximum BMC of 2.0 in the treatment city, whereas the maximum BMC in the control city is 1.3 for five claims or more. We should mention here that many of these accidents are small: 33% of claims are lower than 1,000 yuan and 63% are lower than 2,000 yuan while The BMC now follows the insured in the treatment city even if the insured switches to another insurer, as in France (Dionne et al., 2013a) . The new experience rating based on past claims had been enforced for all vehicle insurers in the treatment city. This may help improve road safety, but the relative numbers in Table 1 still may not introduce the appropriate incentives because they do not differ very significantly. Specifically, the coefficients for 2 past claims and 3 past claims for last year are the same for the treatment city and the control city, and these two levels of BMC represent a large number of insureds. Table 2 -Detailed MC based on traffic violations in the treatment city This table presents the new insurance pricing based on traffic violations. The variation of the insurance premium in year t uses the information on traffic violations from the year t -1 only, along with the information on past accidents in previous years. In other words, a traffic violation is used only once and the cumulative malus coefficient for traffic violations has a maximum of 1.5. For example, drivers who have a traffic violation for drunk driving in year t -1, will have a MC equal to 1.3 in year t. If, in addition, these drivers drove without a licence, their MC will be equal to the maximum 1.5 instead of 1.6. Stage two of the reform started on Oct 15, 2011. Since that date, the pricing depends not only on past claims but also on past traffic violations of the insured. The additional multiplicative malus coefficient (MC) to the basic premium ranges from 1.0 to 1.5 depending on the seriousness of cumulative traffic violations during the previous year. Table 2 presents the coefficients related to different traffic violations. The system has no cumulative memory over time in the sense that only traffic violations committed in the previous year matter. There are 7 levels of malus coefficient for different traffic violations that insured commit. The total malus coefficient is the sum of the penalty coefficients accumulated over the previous year plus one.
Level
The total malus coefficient reaches its maximum at 1.5. During the first year of application, the individual's cumulative traffic violations were taken from the date of the second-stage reform to the start of the next insurance contract. In the subsequent insurance periods, the traffic violations over the past 365 days are used for the next year insurance pricing.
This is the first time in the Chinese vehicle insurance market that the insurance premium is legally adjusted according to the record of insureds' traffic violations. Vehicle insurers in the treatment city must use available information on past infractions to price insurance, as in the new BMC scheme. In the next sections, our analysis will be based on the quasi-experiment that the two-step new experience rating system has been put into practice in the treatment city, whereas the control city did not experience any change in the vehicle insurance pricing system during the same time period. At this point, when comparing the two-stage reform, it seems that the second-stage reform provides more incentives for road safety than the first stage does. It is important to mention that the reform did not suddenly appear. From Nov 4 to Nov 25, 2010, the Insurance Association in the treatment city had informed the public regarding the forthcoming pricing reform. Considering that the insurance premium accounts for only a small part of insureds' disposable income, we believe that the possibility of self-selection for the residence city according to the pricing reform is small.
Data and methodology
Data
The data include the underwriting information and at-fault claims information for the two cities switched between the treatment and the control city within the same insurer. We delete them to avoid the possible endogeneity caused by self-selection. 5 The insurance period of each policy is either 364 or 365 days.
vehicle characteristics 6 such as cargo capacity (load), age, value, actual premium, and type of vehicle. The claims data record the claim frequency during each one-year insurance period, which represent the accident history of the insured. The claims are all based on accidents for which the insured is fully or partially responsible. Therefore, our estimation will not be biased by the claims for which the third party's insurer is fully responsible. For bonus malus management, the insurers treat fully and partially responsible claims in the same manner.
The definitions of all available variables for this study are presented in Table 3 . Past accidents are measured by reported claim frequency. Three variables-Once, Twice, and Number-are employed to act as proxies for accident frequency. Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the outcome variables, the DID variables, and the control variables 7 : the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, median value, and maximum value. Note that the frequencies of at least one (Once) and at least two (Twice) accidents during the insurance period are 0.363 and 0.135 respectively, indicating the very high accident frequency in this country, similar to many Asian countries. The total average number of claims during the insurance period is 0.555 8 :
83.9% of the policies in the sample are from the treatment city. Table 4 shows that the policies 6 Unlike in many countries, vehicle insurers in China do not use drivers' information, such as age, gender, and years of driving experience, for insurance pricing. 7 The table below reports the summary statistics of the outcome variables in the whole sample of policies obtained from the insurer compared with their counterparts in our study sample in Table 4 . In Table 4 , we are limited to vehicles that stay in the sample for three or four consecutive years. It shows that the characteristics of the study sample we retain for estimation are almost identical to those of the whole sample. If we look at the variables regarding the vehicle characteristics in Table 4 , we see that the average age of the vehicle is 3.859 years. The average value of the vehicle is 120,460 yuan and the average actual premium is 2,960 yuan. The average load is 0.027 tons (because the cargo capacity of most regular automobiles is nil). Only 3.6% of the vehicles are imported from other countries; the rest are Chinese domestic vehicles. Variables Type1 to Type5 describe the type of the vehicle; 85.1% are regular automobiles (with 6 or fewer passengers).
The summary statistics of the control variables for the treatment group and the control group during the pre-treatment period (Before Mar 1, 2011) are presented in Table 5 . We can see that the treatment and the control group differ along several of the observable dimensions. This implies that we must use an appropriate methodology to verify that our results are not confounded by these differences. 
Methodology
To examine the impact of the pricing reform on safe driving, we can calculate the difference in the accident frequency before and after the reform in the pilot city. However, some other factors, both observable and unobservable, may influence road safety over time. The existence of the control group can isolate some common economic shocks. Given that the reform city is a pilot city, it can be regarded as the treatment group; the other city in the same province is the control group. By comparing the difference in the treatment group and the difference in the control group before and after the reform, DID eliminates the potential bias that comes from the effects other than the reform, which could affect the treatment group. The DID, which measures the differential effect of the reform across the two groups, is highly suitable for establishing causal relationships in the setting of a natural experiment. We expect to observe a lower accident frequency in the treatment group compared with the control group after the introduction of experience rating. Moreover, owing to the rather short period of analysis, one can assume that the populations of drivers in the two cities are fairly similar during the four years, and conclude that any causal relationship is more attributable to moral hazard than to adverse selection (See Chiappori, 2000, and Chiappori and Salanié, 2013 , for a longer discussion on this important issue).
9 Equation (1) shows our basic regression approach.
where w is a constant term. (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008) . Consequently, our main results are presented using the linear model in (1). We will revisit this issue in the robustness section of the article (Table 15 ).
The DID methodology addresses the concerns of omitted variables that might affect both the The time fixed effect dummies control for this effect before and after the two reforms. After the reform, the three variables of both the treatment group and the control group declined continuously. However, the disparity between the treatment group and the control group seems to expand after the second-stage reform. The observed enlarged disparity seems to be related to a much greater decrease in the claim frequency of the treatment group compared with the control group. This is consistent with our expectations that the new insurance incentives introduced in the treatment group would reduce accident frequency accordingly. Accident is measured by Once, Twice, and Number, and i is a count number.
Multivariate results
The effects of the reform are captured by the DID results presented in Table 6 . Models (1) and (2) report the results for Once; models (3) and (4) for Twice; and models (5) and (6) for Number. In models (1), (3), and (5) we report the basic regression results without the inclusion of vehicle controls. We further add vehicle controls in models (2), (4), and (6). For accident frequencies we see that the coefficients of Reform1 are not significant at the conventional level, while the coefficients of Reform2 are consistently highly significant at the 0.1% level for every model with the exception of model (3) for twice without control variables (only at 10%). show that the age and value of the vehicle, and the insurance premium paid negatively affect the accident frequency; the effects are significant at the 0.1% level in each case. When we look at the coefficient for Age and Age 2 , we see a significant U-shaped influence.
From Figure 2 we see a decreasing time trend both for the treatment group and the control group at the macro level. By assuming that the day fixed effects are equal across the study period, we now use a linear time trend, t λ , to replace the day fixed effects, d η in Equation 1.
The results are reported in Table 7 . After comparing Table 6 and Table 7 , we find that the results in Table 7 (linear time trend) confirm the results in Table 6 (day fixed effects). The results in Table 7 indicate bigger magnitude and statistical significance for the second-stage reform. Figure 3 depicts the averages of the fitted values (according to the end date of each insurance policy) of Once, Twice, and Number based on regressions in model (1), (3), and (5) in Table 7 . We observe significant and consistent effects of the second-stage reform. For the first-stage reform, the effects work only for Twice (without control variables) and Number (wrong sign), as observed in Table 7 . 1) is employed for all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001.
(1)Once (2)Once (3)Twice (4)Twice (5)Number (6)Number η , replaced by a linear time trend, t λ . Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001, ** p<0.01, and * p<0.05.
(1)Once (2)Once (3)Twice (4)Twice (5) 
Robustness checks
Value of vehicle
The capacity of monetary instruments to deter traffic violations is expected to vary depending on the wealth and income of the vehicle owners (Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote, 2004; Polinsky, 2006; Polinsky and Shavell, 1991) . We may then question whether the impact of the reform differs depending on the levels of wealth and income of the insured. Given that we do not have access to data on wealth and income, we consider the value of the vehicle as a proxy variable for the wealth of the insured. Using the median value of the vehicles in the first year at the insurance company, 11 we split the sample into two groups, namely low value group and high value group, to investigate the differential impact of the reform between these two groups. We repeat the regressions in Table 6 for these two groups. The results for the low value group are reported in Table 8 .1 and those of the high value group in Table 8 .2. We notice that the claim frequency measured by Once, Twice and Number of the two groups is consistently negative at the 0.1% or 1% significance level with one exception for the low value group and two exceptions for the high value group (the three models without control variables).
After comparing the magnitude and the statistical significance for the second-stage reform in tables 8.1 and 8.2, we find that the low value group seems more responsive than the high value group. To obtain more evidence we include, in an additional regression, a dummy variable that equals 1 when the value of the vehicle is higher than or equal to the median and an interaction of the dummy and Reform2 variable to rerun the OLS regressions. The results (available from authors) show that the null hypothesis of no statistical difference can be rejected at the 0.1% level for Twice and Number. We therefore conclude that the low value group (less wealthy 11 In our study sample, the first year for the 3-year data is 2010, and for the 4-year data it is 2009. Using this criterion enables us to keep the same panel structure as before.
people) respond more to the second-stage reform than the wealthy people do, which is partly consistent with Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote's (2004) results.
Domestic vehicles
Because there are expensive imported vehicles (3.6% of the vehicles are imported) in our data, we drop them and keep only the domestic ones to see whether the results are robust. The results for domestic vehicles only are shown in Table 9 . The results are fairly consistent. Table 8 .1 -Robustness check: Effects of insurance incentives on accident frequency of low value group Based on the median value of vehicles in the first year, we split the sample into two subsamples: 1) the low value sample, which is lower than the median; and 2) the high value sample, which is equal to or higher than the median. The results for the low value group and high value group are reported in tables 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. The OLS fixed effects model (Equation 1) is employed for all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001, ** p<0.01, and * p<0.05. 1) is employed in all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001. 
Age of vehicle
We use the median age of the vehicle in the first-year portfolio of the insurance company to split the sample into two groups: 1) low age group (below 3 years) and 2) high age group, to test whether the impact of the reform differs between these two groups. We rerun the regressions in Table 6 . The results for the low age group are reported in Table 10 .1 and for the high age group in Table 10 .2. The estimations in both groups confirm the results in Table 6 , but the low age group seems more responsive than the high age group. This may be explained by the difference in the basic premiums of the a priori pricing of the vehicles: the average basic premium (without the multiplicative BMC and MC) for vehicles less than three years old is 4,600 yuan, compared with 4,100 yuan for the older ones. Therefore, obtaining a high multiplicative malus factor is more costly for newer vehicles. Table 5 shows that most of the vehicles are regular automobiles (Type 3) with 6 or fewer passengers. We keep these automobiles and delete the other types of vehicles to see whether the results change fundamentally. The results for regular automobiles are reported in Table 11 .
Regular automobile
Once again, we see (with few exceptions and without control variables) the consistently significant effects of the second-stage reform on accident frequency measured by Once, Twice and Number.
Less than three claims
In our study sample, 89.6% of the vehicles filed fewer than 3 claims (0 claim, one claim or two claims) during the insurance period for either three consecutive years, from 2010 until 2012, or four consecutive years from 2009 until 2012. We keep these vehicles to run the robustness check, and the results are reported in Table 12 . The previous conclusion is confirmed once again by the subsample analysis, meaning that the incentive effects of the reform are also significant for low-risk owners.
Moral hazard
Up to now, we have controlled for the vehicle type in order to limit the adverse selection effect.
However, bad drivers can leave the market following a large increase in their insurance premium, particularly in the treatment city. We do not have data on drivers but we know the owners of the vehicles and those who face large insurance premiums may sell their car to new owners who believe they are better drivers and can reduce the premium of the vehicle over time. These changes in ownership may partly explain the results in Table 6 and reduce the pure moral hazard effect.
During our study period 382 vehicles change owners. We delete them to run the robustness check shown in Table 13 . The results in Table 6 are confirmed again with the sample of the same vehicle owners before and after the reform. This result reinforces the interpretation that the reform effects are mainly related to a reduction in moral hazard because the two populations of owners (not only of vehicles) are identical before and after the reform in Table 13 .
Other events: Effects of the subway
The occurrence of some unobservable events before and after the reform in the treatment city may influence the outcome variables, which can hinder the objectivity of the evaluation of the reform because of the omission of key control variables in the model (Meyer, 1995) . To the best of our knowledge, no other event may have caused the differential accident frequencies of the two groups during the post-second-stage-reform years of our study. One exception may be several subway lines that were put into use in the treatment city; drivers may choose to take the subway instead of drive, which will surely reduce the accident frequency. Line 2 opened on Dec 28, 2010 (during the pre-reform period) and Line 3 and 5 on Jun 28, 2011 (after the first-stage reform and before the second-stage reform). We run a similar regression as in Table   6 to see whether the pre-reform accident frequency of the treatment city was affected by Line 2 and the results are reported in Table 14 . We do not find any significant effects. In addition,
considering that the effects of the first-stage reform are insignificant and that Lines 3 and 5
were introduced during the post-first-stage-reform period, we believe that the effects of the new subway lines on road safety are negligible. We therefore conclude that the pricing reform based on traffic violations is the only reason that the accident frequency of the treatment city deviates from the common trend of the two cities.
Non-linear models
Finally, we could have used non-linear models to estimate the different accident frequency models. As Blundell and Costa-Dias (2008) contend, extending the standard DID methodology to non-linear models needs adjustment in many circumstances if one wants to keep all the properties of the methodology. In our case, the results are fairly consistent. Table 15 presents our main results with fixed effects non-linear models (Logit, Poisson, and Negative Binomial).
Again, the main results of our study presented in Table 6 are robust to the methodology used in these estimations. Table 10 .1 -Robustness check: Effects of insurance incentives on accident frequency of low age group According to the median age of vehicle in the first year, we split the sample into two subsamples:1) low age sample, which is smaller than the median; and 2) high age sample, which is equal to or higher than the median. The results for the low age group and high age group are reported in tables 10.1 and 10.2 respectively. The OLS fixed effects model (Equation 1) is employed for all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001 and * p<0.05. 1) is employed for all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001 and * p<0.05.
(1)Once (2)Once (3)Twice (4)Twice (5)Number (6)Number 1) is employed for all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001, ** p<0.01, and * p<0.05. 1) is employed for all specifications. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses. *** indicates p<0.001. Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Robust standard errors are employed and t statistics are reported in parentheses.
(1)Once (2)Once (3)Twice (4)Twice (5)Number (6)Number (5) and (6); and the negative binomial fixed effects model for models (7) and (8). Once, Twice, and Number are three proxies for accident frequency, which stand for the probability of making at least one claim, the probability of making at least two claims, and the number of claims during the insurance period respectively. Models (1) and (2) report the results for Once; models (3) and (4) for Twice; models (5) and (6) for Number (Poisson Model); and models (7) and (8) 
Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of a causal effect of moral hazard on accident frequency in China.
To establish causality, we exploit a vehicle insurance pricing reform introduced in a pilot city in China as a natural experiment. We obtained data from an insurer that is present in both the treatment city and the control city. Prior to the reform, the pricing mechanism was the same in both cities. We find strong behavioral effects arising from the reform. The results show that the addition of an experience-rated premium based on traffic violations reduces the accident frequency significantly (more than 15% for the total number of accidents). This conclusion is robust to the inclusion of vehicle controls, alternative definitions of claim frequency, and several robustness checks. We also find that the effects of improving the experience-rated premium based on past claims are not significant.
An open question is why the effects of the traffic violation reform are stronger than those of past claims reform. The change in the pricing formula based uniquely on past claims may not have been sufficiently large to change claims behavior even if the first-stage reform forced insurers to commit to using past claims when applying the new pricing policy. Specifically, for less risky insured, namely those who file fewer than two claims per insurance period, the firststage reform is still more a reward than a punishment (Panel 1a, Table 1 ), whereas the secondstage reform is a complete punishment when they accumulate traffic violations. The different results for the two reforms may be due to the possibility that a punishment stimulates safe driving better than a reward does, although, in theory, both rewards and punishments can act as incentives. Of course, the relative values are important to set the optimal incentive scheme for road safety, and the second-stage reform parameters appear to be more penalizing.
Moreover, because the insurer observes only the claims and not all accidents, insured may have chosen to underreport some past (minor) accidents in order to avoid an increase in their premium (Cohen 2005; Robinson and Zheng, 2010) . In fact, insured have a greater incentive to underreport past claims after the first-stage reform than before because of the new commitment rule and the steeper BMC. Consequently, the insignificant net effect may be explained by a trade-off between additional incentives for road safety along with additional incentives for underreporting accidents. Because the observed distribution of claims is a truncation of the true accident distribution, the observed effects of basing the pricing on past claims may be biased (Chiappori, 2000 , Dionne et al. 2013a ). 
